BRITISH INTERESTS IN PALESTINE

By

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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT

This memorandum lays the foundation of its argument for a more active advancement of the British mandate in Palestine on a consideration of British interests, military and political, in the Near East. Palestine is necessary to the defence of the Suez Canal, our main artery of communication with India (Paragraph 4). So far from adding to our responsibilities, Zionist Jews, because they are necessary to the formation of a strong Palestinian nation, redeem our task in Palestine from the reproach of being a dangerous speculative adventure and bring it into line with the general policy of the British Commonwealth which lightens British burdens by creating new nations and so reconciles Union with Liberty (Paragraphs 5 and 6). So complete, indeed, is the ideality of British and Zionist interests in Palestine, that if there were no Zionism, our policy would have been driven to make it. Stress is further laid on the importance of Palestine as a link of air-communication with India (Paragraphs 7 to 9).

The question of the Arabs is next examined and leads to an analysis of the reasons which depleted the early war enthusiasm for Zionism and caused the Palestine administration to make itself the patron of the Arabs rather than to prosecute with energy the purpose of the Mandate (Paragraphs 10 to 13). These mistakes came to a head in the

weakness of the last Labour Government, but the promises of Mr. MacDonald as Labour Prime Minister and the advent of the National Government seemed to engage a more vigorous co-operation of the Palestine Administration with Zionist essays in nation-building (*Paragraph* 14).

These hopes have been partly satisfied by the remarkable success of Zionist enterprise in Palestine, but their hunger has been at the same time sharpened by the grave crisis in Jewry that came to a head with the persecution of the Jews in Germany. The old bond of material interest between British and Jewish interests in the East was now confirmed by an ideal association in defence of liberty and liberation against the new political conception of the "totalitarian State" (*Paragraphs* 15 *to* 17).

It has become necessary to hasten the pace and intensity of our efforts in Palestine, and to enlist the ability of German Jewry in the services of Palestine and of a regenerated East. Let the Government realise the chance that is now afforded without offence to any nation of furthering the hopes of justice to the Jews, of liberty, and of a new enrichment, moral as well as material, of the East. Already there is a scarcity of labour in Palestine, while the Palestine administration is restricting Jewish immigration. The Government is exhorted to strike off the fetters of timidity on a work of regeneration, and to rise to the height of a great argument alike of Liberty and of Imperial Construction (*Paragraphs* 18 *to* 22).

British Interests in Palestine

By

Herbert Sidebotham

1. This memorandum is a plea for a more active and sympathetic British policy in Palestine especially in regard to Jewish immigration. The immediate issue to which its observations are addressed is how many Jews should be admitted during the next few years which threaten to be so critical for Jewry. The principle on which the numbers are fixed is " the economic absorptive capacity " of the country, but how widely estimates of that capacity vary many be gathered from the fact that the Jewish Agency last October asked for a quota of 24,000 and received from the Palestine Government only 5,500 net certificates or less than a quarter. The difference is explained, less one suspects by disagreement on the interpretation of economic facts, than by some deeper and more radical difference of mood or general aims. We are the trustees of the National Home in Palestine and if there were any clash between British and Jewish interests we ought not to be administering the trust. But there is, in fact, no clash and that there has sometimes appeared to be one is due as much or more to a misunderstanding of British as of Jewish interests. The writer has, therefore, preferred to see the problem from the angle of British

interests, moral be it understood as well as material. It may be worth adding that he has been a Zionist since 1915—and is not a Jew.

2. The National Home long since overcame its open enemies who, except among Arab sheiks and English newspaper proprietors, had never been numerous or formidable. The enemies which have given it most trouble have been subtler and harder to be at close grips with. They were departmental listlessness and inertia, lack of imagination, reluctance to rise to the height of a great idea, and timidity ; and among the mass of the British people indifference and lack of knowledge. These obstructions have been the more difficult because they have been covered by friendship towards the Zionist ideal, sometimes feigned, but frequently quite genuine. Indeed, the very success of the Zionist Movement in spite of them is sometimes made a justification for past policy and an argument for continued application of the brake. How, it is asked, can you pretend to have a grievance when you are in fact doing so well ? As to the indifference of the British public it may be the Zionists are paying now for the suddenness and ease of the War Cabinet's conversion to the National Home. It was the conversion of an executive, ratified repeatedly both by later governments and by a solemn international mandate, but never so well rooted in the minds of the mass of the people as it would have been had the conversion taken place more slowly through long political propaganda and controversy. Finally, all through history the Gentile friends of Jewry—Cyrus, Alexander the Great, Julius Caesar, the great Popes (with one exception), Moorish and Turkish Sultans in the day of their pride, Cromwell, Napoleon, Disraeli down to Balfour—have all been on the tops of human intellect and achievement ; anti-Semitism, on the other hand, has always been the sure mark of the second or

third rate mind and of a sense of inferiority. But Balfour has gone and Lloyd George has lost his place in politics, and no one now seems ready to draw their bow. Jewry is waiting for another great man—English, Scottish or Welsh—to re-knit and revivify its alliance with the British Commonwealth.

3. The listlessness and timidity of which complaint has been made have their roots in a set of ideas which regarded Zionism alternatively as a fad that would never come to anything, and as an aggressive force which endangers our military security and compromises the natural development of our policy in the Near East. These ideas must be examined, and first those that group round the word security. Why did we go to Palestine ? why did we stay ? What were the alternatives and what is the function of the National Home in relation to our Imperial policy ?

4. We went into Palestine during the war to lay the foundations for a new Eastern policy in place of the old policy which at that time had crumbled into ruins. Long after Salisbury's famous warning, we had persisted to the end in backing the wrong horse. The Turks had attacked the Suez Canal and proved that in conditions more favourable to the attack the main artery of British Imperial communications through the Suez Canal might be cut. Accordingly we had for greater safety to cross the desert and occupy at least the Judaean Hills. Palestine in Biblical history was the Belgium of the ancient world, situated as it was between the rival empires of the Nile and Mesopotamia, and the most famous military road in all history runs through it and is commanded by its hills. Geography does not change. Except by the ignorant it has never been denied that the possession of the Judaean

Hills is most desirable for any power that is responsible for the defence of Egypt. The agreement negotiated between M. Picot and Sir Mark Sykes in 1916 before there was much thought of recognising Palestine as a political unit nevertheless left those hills in our possession.

5. But the military argument could not stop with the occupation of Judea or Jerusalem. Military bastions, however useful in a war, are barren and costly in peace. But what if you could make a nation of all Palestine, and populate it with a race both patriotic and friendly to yourself ? Then you would not merely have increased security at no cost, but you would gain many other advantages too. Who could fill that rôle ?

6. Hardly the Arabs who in Palestine are a more mixed and feebler race than the Arabs of the Yemen or the Hedjaz, and have never been able to resist the passage of hostile armies. Indeed, they have never regarded Palestine as a separate country or nation, but only politically speaking as part of Syria. Supposing there had been no mandate for Palestine (and but for the Jews there certainly would have been no British mandate), Palestine must inevitably have been a part of Syria. But an independent Syria must, sooner or later, have fallen to Turkey, and even if France had held the Syrian mandate it would have been uncomfortably coterminous with the Canal. In either case we should have been just as insecure as in 1914.

Sir Mark Sykes had once a vision of an immense Arab Empire stretching from the Mediterranean to Persia with France and England in possession of the northern and southern edges respectively. That idea was knocked on the head by France when she ejected Feisul from Damascus. Such an Empire would in any case have been quite unmanageable and been distracted by civil wars.

The erection of the State of Irak and of the separate principality of Transjordania (an unwise dismemberment of Palestine) was a modest version of the original project, but the ill-success of Transjordania shows how completely lacking among the Arabs were the materials of a strong, progressive Palestine. Abdulla himself has latterly expressed a desire for Jewish immigration into Transjordania because only with them could he properly develop his country.

7. Only the Jews then could make of Palestine a nation fit to stand alone some day. That does not necessarily mean that Palestine should be a Jewish State or even, in Dr. Weizmann's phrase, a country as Jewish as England is English, though such conditions might have been quite consistent with the maintenance of civil and religious rights of non-Jews. It does mean that you must have Jews in sufficiently large numbers to stiffen Palestine into a real nation fit to govern itself, able to keep order within its borders, and radiating a civilising influence through the East. With enough Jews in Palestine we reach a degree of military and political security at which strategy merges into the free politics and nationhood of which the British Dominions are types. The Jew can be a patriot under other allegiances ; but only in Palestine and in Palestine only does patriotism become his religion. How tenacious and patriotic the Jew can be in defence of the land he loves the classic history in Palestine has proved hundreds of times. Thus the argument for the military safety of Egypt insensibly grew into an argument for a re-created nation of Palestine and for a re-created Palestine Jews must be a very large and potent ingredient in the population. Here was no policy of military adventure ; rather was it a policy of military retrenchment by the traditional British method of making a new nation.

But if we think of the future of Palestine in the idioms of the future not of the past, those arguments are still further strengthened. Much has been said already of the importance of Palestine to the safety of the Canal and to the maintenance of our communications with India and the East, and that argument will never be superseded. But it is supplemented if we think in terms not of the old communications by sea and rail but of air transport. For the Suez Canal will in the future be vulnerable to attack from the air as well as from land. Egypt might not always be a friendly country, and it is even conceivable that the Mediterranean in a future war might be closed to our merchant shipping.

It may be that the oil pipe-line from Mosul and the future railway that will connect Irak with Mesopotamia may make Haifa the greatest entrepôt of trade in the Eastern Mediterranean. It may supersede Malta in importance as a naval base. But to the exercise of air-power, whether in peace or in war, Haifa will be indispensable. It is the most vital link in the chain of British air-stations between here and India. The time may come, too, when we may be grateful for the port of Akabah, where Palestine comes down to the Red Sea.

8. It has been observed that without the Jews there might have been no British mandate in Palestine. But without a mandate British rights there would have been those of conquest only, might have provoked the jealousy of other powers, hampered our diplomacy much as our occupation of Egypt once did, and possibly have led to war. Conversely, the mandate has put a halo of sanctity round a very necessary reconstruction of British policy in the Near East and disarmed jealousy by an International Mandate. That is not the least service of Zionism to our British interests.

9. But there is one proviso. When you are aiming at political results by producing a state of mind time is of the essence. The Balfour declaration was good War propaganda because it was made when it was. Had it been delayed the Germans would certainly have anticipated us. Similarly, if we are investing in the Jewish love of Palestine and in Jewish gratitude to the Power that restores them to it expedition is important and doubts, misgivings and suspicions must all tend to reduce the rate of return. He gives twice who gives quickly.

This proviso made, Zionism so far from being a political adventure is the best of all insurances. In a sentence, so strong is the argument for Zionism to our own security that if there had been no Zionism ready made to our hand by thousands of years of Jewish suffering we should have had to invent it. So thought the youthful Napoleon who, on his way to conquer the East, began by proclaiming a new Zion at Jerusalem.

10. Another set of causes which reduced the pace of building the National Home and took the edge off that world-wide Jewish enthusiasm for Great Britain that followed the Balfour promise may be summed up in the words "Arab rights." Let us suppose it conceded that we stand to gain in military security by the success of Zionism and by the speedy formation of a Palestinian nationality. The question still remained whether we were quite free to indulge these calculations. Did we not also owe a duty to the Arabs ? Did not the mandate instruct us so to found the National Home as not to prejudice the civil and religious rights of Arabs and others and was not the instruction of Jewish immigration in another article so to promote it as to ensure that the " rights and position of other sections of the population are not prejudiced " ? " Position " was a word that might mean anything

according to the fancy or prejudice of the administration, which in spite of the fact that the First High Commissioner, Sir Herbert Samuel, was a Jew and a Zionist, still contained anti-Semites. Again, there was a long delay between the promise in 1917 and the adoption of the Mandate in 1922 and it gave opportunities to persistent Arab intrigues. More important still the temper of the British people completely changed in those years. They had turned anti-Imperialists and determined to run no risks ; they had taken off their khaki and nothing should induce them to put it on again. The result was a growing indifference to the politics of the Near East and a strong dis-taste for any political objects abroad that prejudice could describe as risky or costly. That Palestine after military government was ended was, thanks to the Jew, to cost the British tax-payer nothing was not understood as yet, nor yet that the country would soon be drawing from the rest of the world a Jewish tribute for its development.

11. The effect of these changes in mood was apparent in the White Paper in 1922 defining what was meant by the National Home. In 1917 it had meant in all probability a Jewish state ; now in 1922 the purely cultural and idealistic value of the Home was insisted on. Many zealous Zionists were disappointed with this change, but Dr. Weizmann, the head of the Zionist Organisation, kept his own jingoes in order and wisely accepted the new definition. He belonged to the *faire sans dire* school and he was too anxious to get to real work to worry unduly about definitions. He was confident of the result and content to trust to the logic of facts. The event justified him for the progress made by Palestine, thanks to Jews, was within ten years to make it a dominant fact in Near Eastern affairs.

12. Would that the Palestine administration had done the same. There never was any difficulty about respecting the religious and civil rights of the other races or the slightest disposition on the part of Jews to interfere with them. The sound policy for the Government would have been to ignore racial differences, and boldly proclaim that its policy was to make of Palestine a great country worthy of its great past. Instead, it showed itself acutely conscious of racial differences and, seeking to conciliate the Arabs by concessions, confirmed their cleverly incompetent leaders in the belief that they had a grievance, that the harmony between England and Zionists was broken, and that if only they made a sufficient nuisance of themselves they might get rid of the Mandate. Sir Herbert Samuel was a good Zionist, but also a conscientious Liberal who, unable to forget the triumph of healing wrought by self-government in South Africa, tended to think that representative government was a cure-all. In the different circumstances of Palestine his proposals for a representative assembly were unpopular with Jews and contemptuously rejected by the Arabs. Even more serious was Mr. Churchill's action in Transjordania. The ink was scarcely dry on the Mandate when Mr. Churchill, by creating Transjordania as a separate Arab emirate, put more than half Palestine out of bounds of the National Home. He understood Zionism and within limits was sympathetic to it, but he completely under-estimated the strength of the driving force which was behind it.

13. That was a mistake often made at first as well by those who sympathised with Zionism as by those who disliked it. Presently there came a stage at which the Administration settled down to take the line of least resistance and (as all Civil Services will if they are allowed) indulged the natural man's preference for a quiet life

and no change. The Mandate said : Establish a National Home for Jews, but do not injure the rights of non-Jews. The Administration bracketed the main purpose of the Mandate with its proviso and treated them as equal positive injunctions ; but as the Jews were showing so much energy in making the Home it tended to think that its own main duty was to protect the Arab against an excess of Jewish enthusiasm. It wanted an easy life, fumed at the Zionists for being so keen, and was disposed to resent Jewish energy as an interference with departmental peace. The complaint in fact now was not that Zionism was a theorist's fad but that it was too realistic, doing too well and going too fast. Then came the trouble at the Wailing Wall, and what if the Arabs had been a more capable and stronger people would have been open rebellion. It was, in fact, nothing more than a succession of murderous riots. Lord Plumer would have stopped these disorders in a few hours, but in the absence of the new High Commissioner, Sir John Chancellor, some of the officials lacked energy and others were not able wholly to conceal their prejudices against the Jews. The result was a tremendous explosion of anger all over the world at what was justly regarded as a lamentable failure of the Government in its first duty of protecting life and property, and the Government, startled by the explosion, proceeded to lay the blame on the Jews : their purchases of land were alleged to have created a large class of landless and discontented Arabs and an entirely new view of British policy in Palestine was now put forward. It may be expressed briefly, but not unfairly, in two propositions : first, that every Jewish settler placed on the land or brought into industry tended to throw an Arab out of employment ; second, that the true interpretation of the Mandate to establish the Home for Jews was that the Arabs were to be regarded as debenture holders in the country and Jews ordinary shareholders

only; and in consequence, thirdly, that the unprogressive Arabs were to set the pace in the creation of the Home and the development of the country. Thus was the trust for the Home in danger of becoming a trust against itself.

14. This was too much and the leaders of both Conservative and Liberal Parties at home joined in strong protest. In the result Mr. MacDonald, then Labour Prime Minister, reaffirmed the plain meaning of the Mandate. Referring to the use of the word " position " in the Mandate Mr. MacDonald declared that it must not be read to mean that existing economic conditions were to be crystallised, " on the contrary, the obligation to facilitate Jewish immigration and to encourage close settlement by Jews on the land remains a positive obligation of the Mandate and it can be fulfilled without prejudice to the right and position of other sections of the population of Palestine." The phrasing might have been more definite, but the meaning was clear enough. It meant, surely, that henceforth no artificial impediments were to hinder the progress of Palestine and that the rate of advance was to be determined solely by the power of the country to absorb the economic enrichment of its life brought by the Jews.

On the eve of the formation of the National Government—the point to which this argument has now brought us—we may pause and formulate certain conclusions touching the honour and interests of England that ought henceforth to determine our action in Palestine. They are these :—

(a) The honour and prestige of England depend on our making the Mandate a success. No one will ever believe that the problem is beyond us and if we are not seen to be actively contributing to

success it will be put down to lack, not of power, but of good will.

(b) So far, apart from the expulsion of the Turks and the reorganisation of finance and transport, the administration of Palestine has contributed little to the success won by the efforts of Zionists. It has seemed unconscious that twenty centuries were looking down upon its work. It has been parochial minded in its handling of a great world problem. It has regarded the prejudice of a few Arab Sheiks and the bigotry of their dupes as of equal importance to the pin-pricks of the world's conscience and its determination after a War, fought for the rights of nationality, to right the oldest and supreme instance of wronged nationality. It has been a sedentary judge between nations—and not too impartial a judge—when destiny was calling it to act and to help to create a new Palestine nation.

(c) We had, therefore, much leeway to make up and it was now our duty to act with all the greater decision and courage.

Palestine is no exception to the rule that is coming to be applied to governments in all parts of the world. No longer must we conceive their functions as merely obsequious to the course of events. Governments must be formative, must anticipate tendencies and shape them for the well-being of the country that is in their charge. The days in which government was no more than administration are past.

15. Partly as a result of this reassertion of the Mandate principle, partly as accruing interest on past hard work, the progress of Palestine was now accelerated. It had suffered like the rest of the world from the depression that

followed the artificial boom of the early peace. But from the worst depression that began in 1928 it was immune. When every other country in the world was suffering from unemployment and was embarrassed in its finances Palestine had next to no unemployment and its budgets showed large surpluses. The present High Commissioner, General Wauchope, is an able man and his relations are excellent with both Jews and Arabs. The story of Palestine's material progress has often been told and does not need repetition here. The difficulty of the argument indeed is not that the Jews have done ill but that they have done so well. Paradoxically the argument of the rest of this Memorandum would actually be easier if past shortcomings of expectation had been with the Zionists instead of with the Administration.

16. Jews might have been content to continue the pace of former progress but for a crisis in the history of Jewry which came to a head with the triumph of Herr Hitler in Germany. Jewish talent had probably contributed proportionately more to the accomplishment and fame of Germany than of any other country in the world, but no service availed them against the doom of helotry to which they were now condemned in Germany. Nor were conditions much better in neighbouring countries. In Poland and Roumania anti-Semitism was active and malignant. Russia was the old land of Pogroms and was not inviting; immigration into the United States, even if it had been prospering, was limited by the quota; France and England with their vast armies of unemployed could only take a limited number of Jewish exiles from Germany.

The Jewish position has been serious for the last century; but looking at the history of the last hundred years one has to admit that it was never so uniformly

bad as it is now ; there were always some compensating influences—*e.g.*, at the time of the Russian persecutions, great openings offered themselves in America, and in fact the present Jewish community in America is largely the result of the immigration of Russian Jews which began in 1894 and continued after the Kishineff pogrom in 1903. To-day, the very political systems obtaining in most countries—the so-called " totalitarian " State—operate against those conceptions for which Jewry (and England) stand, and all those ideals of social justice, individual freedom, peace as against war, and intellectual liberty, which form the essence of Jewish life and have shaped the history of the Jewish people. The totalitarian State, with its suppression of individual liberty, its doctrine of force, its levelling cult of uniformity, is the very antithesis of Judaism. But these States now stretch from the Rhine to the Pacific, and so far as Europe goes, there is only this narrow fringe along the western coast—England, France, and a few small Western European States—to form a bulwark against the enormous pressure exerted by them. It is no wonder that these few countries have received Jewish intellectuals in great numbers (and with great generosity). No wonder the German State has launched its first and most crushing attack on the Jewish element—the very embodiment of the spirit described above; the spirit that has made England and France what they are to-day. The great Jewish communities built up in this spirit in the past are now in danger either of complete disappearance (as in Russia) or of being crushed out of existence (as in Germany) ; it is only on the soil of Palestine that there is a prospect of re-establishing a Jewry which can reproduce and maintain those values which are now being threatened with extinction. England therefore has no mean chance to help in this great process of reconstructing a community which, not only by virtue of its strategic and economic position, but also of its

spiritual values, fits so appropriately into the orbit of that great confederation of nations known as the British Empire.

The only solid hope is in Palestine. Zionism which only a few years ago has been for the average prosperous German Jew a sentiment, a vague aspiration, a bare right due to the race which he might never want to exercise himself, has now become the way of salvation. Will Palestine open her gates wide enough or will the same influences which cramped the conception of the Mandate in the past close the gates against fugitives for safety and very life ?

17. It has already been mentioned that the Palestine Government granted only 5,500 net of the immigration certificates asked for last October by the Palestine Jewish Agency. But the issue is not between a few thousand more or fewer certificates, at any given time, but between two wholly different ways of envisaging the future of Palestine. When the Jewish Agency asked for 24,000 certificates that was the number of labour vacancies which they had in actual sight ; when the Government gave 5,500 only that represented its estimate of the number that could be absorbed in the economic system. But such estimates are almost indefinitely elastic according to the view that is taken of the future. In any case, a Government Department is hardly the best authority to make such estimates. What estimate, for example, would the best civil servant have made of the economic absorptive capacity of Lancashire in, say, 1830 ? In the United States, where faith in the future is universal, governments may be less likely to under-estimate, but in the Old World the bias is hopelessly conservative because the administrative mind conceives economic progress in arithmetical terms only whereas in fact it is both for better

and for worse in geometric ratio. One of the troubles in Palestine is that the Government thinks of it as an old country, but economically it is, thanks to the neglect of a thousand years, one of the newest of countries.

18. Already there is abundant evidence of the scarcity of labour. It began to be felt in January, 1933, and by August it had become acute. Not only were enterprises being held up in their development by lack of labour, but they were beginning to lose the labour they had. The Dead Sea Potash Company, for example, one of the soundest concerns in Palestine, found its employees normally earning between £10 and £16 a month leaving them to join the building trades or set up in small businesses for themselves. It is faced with the alternatives either of raising wages by 50 per cent. over the rates of last year, which of course would diminish its power of competition with other countries, or of suspending parts of its work. That condition is becoming general all over the country. The Administration is apparently damping down immigration because it fears political difficulties. But if the shortage of labour checks expansion and sends up the cost of labour to impossible heights the resultant crisis will be far more severe and prolonged than any political disturbances which past experience shows are short lived and easily dealt with. Such a crisis would quite wrongly be put down to excessive immigration, whereas, in fact, it would have been caused by labour shortage and by undue interference with the normal working of economic law.

19. The greatest mistake that the Palestine Government can possibly make is to give any sort of countenance to the view that more Jews in the country means less work for those who are already there. It is not true even where a Jewish colony displaces Arab tenants or an Arab land-

lord for improved methods of cultivation have created an ever-increasing demand for labour. There is always least Arab unemployment in the neighbourhood of Jewish settlements, most in the purely Arab districts. Further, thanks to Jewish enterprise and capital, all manner of fresh industries are springing up which demand Arab as well as Jewish labour. The immense influx of Jewish capital from abroad is, in fact, to Palestine like the invisible exports of Great Britain ; its cessation would have the same economic effects in Palestine as the loss of British shipping and of our foreign investments would have in our own country. But most important of all the capital that Palestine attracts from Jewry abroad is the capital of brains. If the work done by Jews mainly from Eastern Europe could lay the foundations for the prosperity of 1932 and 1933, what may we not expect when Germany begins to send her Jews, often the pick of her best minds in science and industrial organisation ? Palestine might easily have from ten to twenty thousand of them every year for the next five years. Who shall say what amount of absorptive economic capacity all that ability represents ?

20. In reality the problem as it confronts the Government is not mainly economic, but rather one of faith. The Jews can perhaps be trusted to look after the economic side of the problem ; the Government will best help by not artificially restricting enterprise and by concentrating on its main duties, the maintenance of order and the creation of faith in the future greatness of Palestine. When the Arab once realises that he is about to be a citizen of a great country he will readily coalesce with the Jew. Until he sees and feels the beneficial result he will be the prey of agitators, but already he is much more contented and settled than formerly. Indeed, much of the Arab agitation is deliberately fomented in its own interest by a privileged class which exploited the poverty of the past

and bitterly resents the raising of wages and of the standard of living which the arrival of the Jew has brought to the Arab as well as to himself. Inevitably, there must be friction as the old order passes into the new, but the friction will be less in proportion as the standards and pace of progress are maintained, more if they are checked.

21. Palestine is a small country, but it has an immense backland. For nearly a thousand years the East has slumbered ; as George Eliot and Disraeli have both said in their incomparable fashion, it is the natural rôle of the Jew to mediate between East and West, to reconcile the East to progress and to bring back its old prosperity by his science, his energy, and his love of Palestine. Whatever gain the German promised himself by the Hamburg-Bagdad project that gain will be Palestine's with the help of the Jew. And the addition of the wealth to the world by a Near and Middle East awakened to progress will be comparable to that of a new sub-Continent. It was invention and the development of the Americas that made the burdens of the Napoleonic Wars seem light where they had been crushing. The contribution that a reawakened East can make to the economic problems of the world is not to be despised by us now. For it will not be the old wealth redistributed, but definitely new wealth.

22. The problem of Palestine is not merely local for it is the problem of Jews all over the world and is of deep concern to all humane and generous minds. We are trustees under the Mandate not merely for Jews in Palestine but for Jews everywhere, for all of whom Zion is the lost heirloom of their race, which Britain has promised to redeem. On its practical side the problem is best conceived by us in the same terms that we should apply to a Dominion of the British Empire. Our object should be

the same as we set before ourselves in the British Dominions, namely, to found a nation of equal status with ourselves, a nation which in Palestine we have it in our power to temper in just those proportions that will produce stability and strength. On the ideal side, the problem is to save a great people from suffering and despair. That no Gentile who befriends the Jewish race has any cause to regret it is true, but not necessary to fortify our resolve to work for this end. Justice obliges us.

APPENDICES

(1) The Balfour Declaration.

(2) Endorsement of the Balfour Declaration by Various Governments.

(3) Letter of The Emir Feisul.

(4) Treaty of Sevres.

(5) The Mandate for Palestine.

(6) San Remo Decision.

(7) Confirmation of the Mandate.

(8) Statement of Policy by Mr. Churchill.

(9) Protest of Mr. Baldwin, Sir Austen Chamberlain and Mr. Amery, and of Mr. Lloyd George and General Smuts.

(10) The Prime Minister's Letter to Dr. Weizmann.

(l) The Balfour Declaration

Foreign Office.

November 2, 1917.

Dear Lord Rothschild,

I have much pleasure in conveying to you, on behalf of His Majesty's Government, the following declaration of sympathy with Jewish Zionist aspirations which has been submitted to, and approved by, the Cabinet.

> "His Majesty's Government view with favour the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, and will use their best endeavours to facilitate the achievement of this object, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country."

I should be grateful if you would bring this declaration to the knowledge of the Zionist Federation.

Yours sincerely,

Arthur James Balfour.

(2) Endorsement of the Balfour Declaration by Various Governments

The Balfour Declaration was endorsed by the Governments of France, Italy, Japan, Serbia, Greece, China, Cuba, South Africa, Poland, Siam and the U.S.A.

(1) France

The French Government published an official communiqué on February 9, 1918, declaring its agreement with the Balfour Declaration.

(2) Italy

On February 25, 1918, the Italian Ambassador in London officially signified the Italian Government's approval of the English and French declarations.

(3) Japan

In January, 1919, the Government signified their approval of the Balfour Declaration.

(4) Serbia

On December 27, 1917, Milenko Vesnitch, head of the Serbian Mission to the United States, sent a letter approving the Balfour Declaration to Captain David Albala, a veteran of the Serbian Army, who forwarded it to the provisional Zionist Committee in the United States of America.

(5) Greece

On March 14, 1918, Mr. Politis, the Greek Minister for Foreign Affairs, made a declaration of sympathy with the Balfour Declaration in the Chamber of Deputies.

(6) China

On December 14, 1918, the Chinese Government officially endorsed the terms of the Balfour Declaration.

(7) Cuba

On April 30, 1919, the Cuban Senate adopted a resolution of sympathy with the Balfour Declaration.

The Endorsement of the American Congress

The American Senate having passed a resolution in favour of the Balfour Declaration, the House of Representatives unanimously adopted a similar resolution on June 30, 1922, as follows :—

> " Whereas the Jewish people have for many centuries believed in and yearned for the rebuilding of their ancient homeland ; and
>
> Whereas, owing to the outcome of the world war, and their part therein, the Jewish people are to be enabled to recreate and reorganise a national home in the land of their fathers, which will give to the House of Israel its long denied opportunity to re-establish a fruitful Jewish life and culture in the ancient Jewish land ; therefore, be it Resolved, by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, that the United States of America favours the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of Christian and all other non-Jewish communities in Palestine and that the holy places and religious buildings and sites in Palestine shall be adequately protected."

(3) Letter of the Emir Feisul

Paris,

March 1, 1919.

Dear Mr. Frankfurter,

I want to take this opportunity of my first contact with American Zionists to tell you what I have often been able to say to Dr. Weizmann in Arabia and Europe.

We feel that the Arabs and Jews are cousins in race, have suffered similar oppressions at the hands of Powers stronger than themselves, and by a happy coincidence have been able to take the first step towards the attainment of their national ideals together.

The Arabs, especially the educated among us, look with the deepest sympathy on the Zionist movement. Our deputation here in Paris is fully acquainted with the proposals submitted yesterday by the Zionist Organisation to the Peace Conference, and we regard them as moderate and proper. We will do our best, in so far as we are concerned, to help them through ; we will wish the Jews a hearty welcome home.

With the chiefs of your Movement, especially with Dr. Weizmann, we have had, and continue to have, the closest relations. He has been a great helper of our cause, and I hope the Arabs may soon be in a position to make the Jews some return for their kindness. We are working together for a reformed and revived Near East, and our two Movements complete one another. The Jewish Movement is national and not imperialist. Our Movement is national and not imperialist, and there is room in Syria for us both. Indeed, I think that neither can be a real success without the other.

People less informed and less responsible than our leaders and yours, ignoring the need for co-operation of the Arabs and the Zionists, have been trying to exploit the local differences that must necessarily arise in Palestine in the early stages of our Movement. Some of them have, I am afraid, misrepresented your aims to the Arab peasantry, and our aims to the Jewish peasantry, with the result that interested parties have been enabled to make capital out of what they call our differences.

I wish to give you my firm conviction that these differences are not on questions of principle, but on matters of detail, such as must inevitably occur in every contact with neighbouring peoples,

and are easily dissipated by mutual goodwill. Indeed, nearly all of them will disappear with fuller knowledge.

I look forward, and my people with me look forward, to a future in which we will help you and you will help us, so that the countries in which we are mutually interested may once again take their place in the community of civilised peoples of the world.

Yours sincerely,

FEISUL.

(4) Treaty of Peace with Turkey

Signed at Sevres, August 10, 1920.

ARTICLE 95

The High Contracting Powers agree to entrust, by application of the provisions of Article 22, the administration of Palestine, within such boundaries as may be determined by the Principal Allied Powers, to a Mandatory to be selected by the said Powers. The Mandatory will be responsible for putting into effect the declaration originally made on November 2, 1917, by the British Government, and adopted by the other Allied Powers, in favour of the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, it being clearly understood that nothing shall be done which may prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country.

ARTICLE 96

The terms of the mandates in respect of the above territories will be formulated by the Principal Allied Powers and submitted to the Council of the League of Nations for approval.

(5) The Mandate for Palestine

The Council of the League of Nations :

Whereas the Principal Allied Powers have agreed, for the purpose of giving effect to the provisions of Article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations, to entrust to a Mandatory selected by the said Powers the administration of the territory of Palestine, which formerly belonged to the Turkish Empire, within such boundaries as may be fixed by them ; and

Whereas the Principal Allied Powers have also agreed that the Mandatory should be responsible for putting into effect the declaration originally made on November 2, 1917, by the Government of His Britannic Majesty, and adopted by the said Powers, in favour of the establishment in Palestine of a national home for the Jewish people, it being clearly understood that nothing should be done which might prejudice the civil and religious rights of existing non-Jewish communities in Palestine, or the rights and political status enjoyed by Jews in any other country ; and

Whereas recognition has thereby been given to the historic connection of the Jewish people with Palestine and to the grounds for reconstituting their national home in that country ; and

Whereas the Principal Allied Powers have selected His Britannic Majesty as the Mandatory for Palestine ; and

Whereas the mandate in respect of Palestine has been formulated in the following terms and submitted to the Council of the League for approval ; and

Whereas His Britannic Majesty has accepted the mandate in respect of Palestine and undertaken to exercise it on behalf of the League of Nations in conformity with the following provisions ; and

Whereas by the afore-mentioned Article 22 (paragraph 8) it is provided that the degree of authority, control or administration to be exercised by the Mandatory, not having been previously agreed upon by the Members of the League, shall be explicitly defined by the Council of the League of Nations ;

Confirming the said mandate, defines its terms as follows :—

ARTICLE 2

The Mandatory shall be responsible for placing the country under such political, administrative and economic

conditions as will secure the establishment of the Jewish national home, as laid down in the preamble, and the development of self-governing institutions, and also for safeguarding the civil and religious rights of all the inhabitants of Palestine, irrespective of race and religion.

ARTICLE 4

An appropriate Jewish agency shall be recognised as a public body for the purpose of advising and co-operating with the Administration of Palestine in such economic, social and other matters as may affect the establishment of the Jewish national home and the interests of the Jewish population in Palestine, and, subject always to the control of the Administration, to assist and take part in the development of the country.

The Zionist organisation, so long as its organization and constitution are in the opinion of the Mandatory appropriate, shall be recognised as such agency. It shall take steps in consultation with His Britannic Majesty's Government to secure the co-operation of all Jews who are willing to assist in the establishment of the Jewish national home.

ARTICLE 6

The Administration of Palestine, while ensuring that the rights and position of other sections of the population are not prejudiced, shall facilitate Jewish immigration under suitable conditions, and shall encourage, in co-operation with the Jewish agency referred to in Article 4, close settlement by Jews on the land, including State lands and waste lands not required for public purposes.

ARTICLE 7

The Administration of Palestine shall be responsible for enacting a nationality law. There shall be included in this law provisions framed so as to facilitate the acquisition of Palestinian citizenship by Jews who take up their permanent residence in Palestine.

ARTICLE 11

The Administration of Palestine shall take all necessary measures to safeguard the interests of the community in connection with the development of the country, and,

subject to any international obligations accepted by the Mandatory, shall have full power to provide for public ownership or control of any of the natural resources of the country or of the public works, services and utilities established or to be established therein. It shall introduce a land system appropriate to the needs of the country, having regard, among other things, to the desirability of promoting the close settlement and intensive cultivation of the land. The Administration may arrange with the Jewish agency mentioned in Article 4 to construct or operate, upon fair and equitable terms, any public works, services and utilities, and to develop any of the natural resources of the country, in so far as these matters are not directly undertaken by the Administration. Any such arrangements shall provide that no profits distributed by such agency, directly or indirectly, shall exceed a reasonable rate of interest on the capital, and any further profits shall be utilised by it for the benefit of the country in a manner approved by the Administration.

ARTICLE 22

English, Arabic and Hebrew shall be the official languages of Palestine. Any statement or inscription in Arabic on stamps or money in Palestine shall be repeated in Hebrew, and any statement or inscription in Hebrew shall be repeated in Arabic.

ARTICLE 25

In the territories lying between the Jordan and the eastern boundary of Palestine, as ultimately determined, the Mandatory shall be entitled, with the consent of the Council of the League of Nations, to postpone or withhold application of such provisions of this mandate as he may consider inapplicable to the existing local conditions, and to make such provision for the administration of the territories as he may consider suitable to those conditions, provided that no action shall be taken which is inconsistent with the provisions of Articles 15, 16 and 18.

NOTE

MEMORANDUM BY THE BRITISH REPRESENTATIVE

(2) In pursuance of the provisions of this Article, His Majesty's Government invite the Council to pass the following resolution :—

"The following provisions of the Mandate for Palestine are not applicable to the territory known as Trans-Jordan, which comprises all territory lying to the east of a line drawn from a point two miles west of the town of Akaba on the Gulf of that name up the centre of the Wady Araba, Dead Sea and River Jordan to its junction with the River Yarmuk; thence up the centre of that river to the Syrian frontier."

(3) His Majesty's Government accept full responsibility as Mandatory for Trans-Jordan, and undertake that such provision as may be made for the administration of that territory in accordance with Article 25 of the Mandate shall be in no way inconsistent with those provisions of the Mandate which are not by this resolution declared inapplicable.

(6) San Remo Decision

On April 24, 1920, the Supreme Council at its meeting in San Remo awarded the mandate for Palestine to Great Britain, France concurring, and added a rider to the effect that the Mandatory Power should itself be responsible for giving effect to the Balfour Declaration.

There were present at the meeting :—

MM. Nitti.
Scialoja.
Lloyd George.
Curzon.
Millerand.
Matsui.
Berthelot.
Johnson.

(7) Confirmation of Mandate

The Council of the League confirmed the Mandate at its session in St. James's Palace, London, on Saturday, July 22, 1922 :—

> "The Council decided that the mandate for Palestine was approved with the revised text of Article 14, and that the mandate for Syria would come automatically into force as soon as the negotiations between the French and Italian Governments had resulted in a final agreement. It was further understood that the two mandates should come into force simultaneously."

The following were the representatives of the States on the Council :—

Present—

Spain :	M. Quinones de Leon (President).
Belgium :	M. Paul Hymans.
Brazil :	M. da Gama.
China :	M. Tang Tsai-Fou.
The British Empire :	Lord Balfour and Mr. H. A. L. Fisher.
France :	M. Rene Viviani.
Italy :	The Marquis Imperiali.
Japan :	Viscount Ishii.

(8) Statement of Policy by Mr. Churchill

When it is asked what is meant by the development of the Jewish National Home in Palestine, it may be answered that it is not the imposition of a Jewish nationality upon the inhabitants of Palestine as a whole, but the further development of the existing Jewish community, with the assistance of Jews in other parts of the world, in order that it may become a centre in which the Jewish people as a whole may take, on grounds of religion and race, an interest and a pride. But in order that this community should have the best prospect of free development and provide a full opportunity for the Jewish people to display its capacities, it is essential that it should know that it is in Palestine as of right and not on sufferance. That is the reason why it is necessary that the existence of a Jewish National Home in Palestine should be internationally guaranteed, and that it should be formally recognised to rest upon ancient historic connection.

This, then, is the interpretation which His Majesty's Government place upon the Declaration of 1917, and, so understood, the Secretary of State is of opinion that it does not contain or imply anything which need cause either alarm to the Arab population of Palestine or disappointment to the Jews.

For the fulfilment of this policy it is necessary that the Jewish community in Palestine should be able to increase its numbers by immigration. This immigration cannot be so great in volume as to exceed whatever may be the economic capacity of the country at the time to absorb new arrivals. It is essential to ensure that the immigrants should not be a burden upon the people of Palestine as a whole and that they should not deprive any section of the present population of their employment.

(9) Protest of Mr. Baldwin, Sir Austen Chamberlain and Mr. Amery

The Times published the following letter on October 23, 1930 :—

" We have learned with deep concern of the resignation of Dr. Weizmann following upon the Government's White Paper with regard to Palestine.

" Dr. Weizmann, during his twelve years' leadership of the Zionist Movement, has been identified with the policy of co-operation with His Majesty's Government, and we take this opportunity to pay our tribute to the unswerving loyalty with which, through many inevitable difficulties and disappointments, he has preserved this principle in practice.

" It is not, however, merely in order to record our personal experience of Dr. Weizmann in his dealing with his Majesty's Government that we address you to-day. That experience does, indeed, convince us that he would have gone any length compatible with his duties towards his own people to facilitate the task of His Majesty's Government in carrying out the Mandate. His letter of resignation points out that he and his colleagues were prepared to seek, in the Hope Simpson Report, ' common ground upon which co-operation with His Majesty's Government might be possible.' We further learn that in a letter to Lord Passfield, dated September 19, 1930, he urged, repeating a request made to the Prime Minister a year before, that His Majesty's Government would at the earliest convenient time summon a Round Table Conference and undertake the part of honest broker between Jews and Arabs in Palestine. Dr. Weizmann states that ' such a conference could render invaluable service in evolving a constructive programme for the future.'

" We are profoundly conscious of the twofold obligation towards Arabs as well as Jews which was embodied in the Mandate and has provided the basis of the policy since pursued by every British Government in turn. What we regret is that His Majesty's Government would appear now to have abandoned that policy ; by ignoring Dr. Weizmann's proposals they have discouraged the effort of the Jewish leaders to promote the good feeling which the Government themselves postulate as the necessary condition of a settlement of Palestinian problems. Without giving either Jewish or Arab opinion an opportunity to express itself or allowing the voice of Parliament to be heard, they have laid down a policy of so definitely negative a character that it appears to us to conflict not only with

the insistence of the Council of the League of Nations that it would be contrary to the intention of the Mandate if the Jewish National Home were crystallised at its present stage of development, but with the whole spirit of the Balfour declaration and of the statements made by successive Governments in the last twelve years. It is only too evident that the effect of the White Paper upon public opinion in American Jewry and elsewhere is to create a feeling of distrust in that British good faith which is the most precious asset of our foreign Imperial policy.

Your obedient servants,

STANLEY BALDWIN,
AUSTEN CHAMBERLAIN.
L. S. AMERY.

10, Upper Brook Street, W.1.
October 22."

Mr. Lloyd George's Protest

"I want to associate myself to the full with the protest signed by Mr. Baldwin, Sir Austen Chamberlain and Mr. Amery against the statement issued by the Colonial Office on the question of Palestine. It looks to me far too much like a breach of national faith.

"At a most critical moment in the war we were anxious to secure the good will of the Jewish community throughout the world on the side of the Allies. The Balfour Declaration about Palestine was a gesture, not merely on our part, but on the part of the Allies to secure that valuable support. It was prepared after much consideration, not merely of its policy, but of its actual wording by the representatives of all the allied and associated countries, including America and our Dominion Premiers. Now, without consulting the United States of America, France, Italy, Belgium or our own Dominions, the British Government issue this statement, which, in substance, is a revocation of a good part of a solemn pledge given at a most solemn moment.

"We shall not reconcile the Arabs, but we shall alienate an even more powerful race, and, what is worse, British honour will be tarnished. We shall be held up throughout the world once more as perfidious Albion. I can understand those who want us to scuttle out of Palestine altogether taking that line, but the majority of the people in this country are not scuttlers, whether in India or Palestine,

and they mean to stand up for the responsibilities and pledges of Empire in both.

"I earnestly hope the Government will reconsider their attitude. I can hardly think that they have given full consideration to its implications. I am all in favour of treating both races upon a basis of equality, but there is no injustice to the Arab involved in the policy adopted by the Allies. It is not a question of expropriating the Arabs. No Arab has yet been forcibly expropriated, no Arabs have even been bought out of land which they were adequately cultivating, but surely the Jews cannot be excluded from settling down in the land which their ancestors made famous for all time."

General Smuts's Protest

"As one of those responsible for the Balfour Declaration I feel deeply perturbed over the present reported Palestine policy, which makes a retreat from the Declaration. The Declaration was a definite promise to the Jewish world that the policy of the National Home would be actively prosecuted and was intended to rally the powerful Jewish influence for the Allied cause at the darkest hour of the War.

"As such it was approved by the Government of the United States and the other allies, and accepted by the Jews in good faith. It cannot now be varied unilaterally by the British Government. It represents a debt of honour which must be discharged in full at all costs and in all circumstances. The original Declaration was far too solemn to permit of any wavering now. I would strongly urge that a Government statement be issued that the terms of the Balfour Declaration will be fully carried out in good faith, and that the Government's Palestine policy will be recast accordingly."

(10) The Prime Minister's Letter to Dr. Weizmann

February 13, 1931.

The words " rights and position of other sections of the population," occurring in Article 6, plainly refer to the non-Jewish community. These rights and position are not to be prejudiced, that is, are not to be impaired or made worse. The effect of the policy of immigration and settlement on the economic position of the non-Jewish community cannot be excluded from consideration. But the words are not to be read as implying that existing economic conditions in Palestine should be crystallised. On the contrary, the obligation to facilitate Jewish immigration and to encourage close settlement by Jews on the land remains a positive obligation of the Mandate, and it can be fulfilled without prejudice to the rights and position of other sections of the population of Palestine.

But the intention of His Majesty's Government appears to have been represented as being that " no further immigration of Jews is to be permitted so long as it might prevent any Arab from obtaining employment." His Majesty's Government never proposed to pursue such a policy. They were concerned to state that, in the regulation of Jewish immigration, the following principles should apply, namely, that " it is essential to ensure that the immigrants should not be a burden upon the people of Palestine as a whole, and that they should not deprive any section of the present population of their employment." (White Paper, 1922.) In the one aspect, His Majesty's Government have to be mindful of their obligations to facilitate Jewish immigration under suitable conditions, and to encourage close settlement of Jews on the land ; in the other aspect, they have to be equally mindful of their duty to ensure that no prejudice results to the rights and position of the non-Jewish community. It is because of this apparent conflict of obligations that His Majesty's Government have felt bound to emphasise the necessity of the proper application of the absorptive capacity principle. That principle is vital to any scheme of development, the primary purpose of which must be the settlement both of Jews and of displaced Arabs upon the land. It is for that reason that His Majesty's Government have insisted, and are compelled to insist, that Government control of immigration must be maintained and that immigration regulations must be properly applied. The considerations relevant to the limits of absorptive capacity are purely economic considerations.

The practice of sanctioning a Labour Schedule of wage-earning immigrants will continue. In each case consideration will be given to anticipated labour requirements for works which, being dependent on Jewish or mainly Jewish capital, would not be or would not have been undertaken unless Jewish labour was made available. With regard to public and municipal works falling to be financed out of public funds, the claim of Jewish labour to a due share of the employment available, taking into account Jewish contributions to public revenue, shall be taken into consideration. As regards other kinds of employment, it will be necessary in each case to take into account the factors bearing upon the demand for labour, including the factor of unemployment amongst both the Jews and the Arabs.

Immigrants with prospects of employment other than employment of a purely ephemeral character will not be excluded on the sole ground that the employment cannot be guaranteed to be of unlimited duration.